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Education Choice of Households and Income Inequality 
– Empirical Research of Mixed Public and Private Education Model – 
 
Hiroki Tanaka∗  Masaya Yasuoka∗∗ 
 
<Abstract> 
This paper presents consideration of a case in which household education investment, 
which determines the human capital of children, is made using education of two types: 
public and private. Furthermore, these analyses based on prefectural panel data 
obtained for Japan are done using a theoretical model by which income inequality 
affects household education choice and illustrates empirically whether or not the choice 
of public and private education in junior and senior high school in Japan is affected by 
household income inequality and by the subsidy provided by central and local 
governments for high school tuition fees. 
The analyses yield the following three results. First, in prefectures with high 
household income inequality, the preference for public education is slight. Second, a 
policy of no tuition fees for public high schools and a decrease in tuition fees for private 
high schools that started from 2010 do not affect public and private education choice for 
high school. Nevertheless, this policy strongly affects enrollment in private junior high 
schools. Third, an increase in subsidies for tuition fees of private high school started in 
2014 raises preferences for private junior high schools and high schools. In addition, in 
the prefecture in which subsidies for tuition fees that are higher than the level decided 
by cental government and the subsidies own benefit for enrollment fees, enrollment in 
private high school is observed to be stimulated. 
JEL Classifications: I24, H52 
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 1. Introduction 
   Education expenditures for children are regarded not only as a consumption good, 
but also an investment good. The choice of education system affects the economic growth 
and welfare of future generations because of human capital accumulation. Preferences 
for education depend strongly on the income level. Therefore, an increase in income 
inequality expands the hierarchy. 
As related literature describing examinations of effects on income inequality, the 
level of human capital, and economic growth, reports present work by Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1992), Cardak (2004), Ray (2006), Futagami and Yanagihara (2008), and 
others. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) examine how the average level of human capital 
stock and inequality of human capital between households are determined in a 
dynamics model by which the human capital of children depends on the human capital 
of their parents and the education investment made by parents for children. Cardak 
(2004) considers the case in which education modes of two types co-exist: public 
education and private education. Cardak (2004) sets the dynamics model in which the 
household choice of education affects the aggregate demand for public and private 
education and examines how public and private education affect the human capital 
stock in the long run. Ray (2006) considers the case in which households face a liquidity 
constraint and sets a dynamics model by which wage inequality between skilled labor 
and unskilled labor is determined endogenously by the private education provided by 
the households. Then, Ray (2006) demonstrates that income inequality brings about 
under-accumulation of human capital. Futagami and Yanagihara (2008) set a dynamics 
model in which the human capital of the children depends on the education time of the 
parent and shows that the growth rate of human capital and welfare differ between 
public education and private education. 
Demand for education depends strongly on the income level. Figure 1-1-1 presents a 
time series of the ratio of junior high school and high school student in public and private 
education from the beginning of the 1980s to the mid-2010s. As a trend, although the 
student ratios of public junior high school and high school decrease, the student ratios 
of private junior high school and high school increase. In this period, considering that 
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the high school enrollment rate remains at a certain level, the household education 
choice is not uniform from the past to the present. It changes with time. 
 
Fig. 1-1-1 Time series of student ratio of public and private junior high school and high school. 
 
Note) These data do not include the early and late course of secondary school. 
Data: “Fundamental school survey (Gakko Kihon Chosa)” (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology, Japan) 
 
Therefore, the possibility must be considered that education choice by households is 
affected by a change of income distribution of households. In Japan, an increase in 
income inequality has been reported. Therefore, it is highly beneficial to examine, both 
theoretically and empirically, how income inequality affects education choice. However, 
among reports of the relevant literature such as those by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), 
Cardak (2004), Ray (2006), and Futagami and Yanagihara (2008), none describes a 
study examining how the income inequality of a household affects education choice and 
human capital accumulation in a model with public and private education.1 
Some empirical studies have examined household income and education choice. 
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) examine correlation between household income and 
                                                   
1 Takii and Tanaka (2009) examine how income inequality and income growth are determined in the 
overlapping generations model in which the choice of public and private education affects the human 
capital distribution. Cardak (2004) also examines the income inequality and income growth in the 
overlapping-generations model in which the choice of public and private education affects the human 
capital distribution. 
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university enrollment based on individual data of younger people in the U.S.A. Based 
on panel data of younger people in the U.S.A., Belly and Lochner (2007) demonstrate 
that child ability and household income are factors affecting university enrollment rates. 
Matsuura and Shigeno (1996) show that the choice of private elementary and junior 
high school is correlated with the parent income and asset level and social status, based 
on individual household data. Sadahiro (2013) uses prefectural data from Japan to 
demonstrate that expenditures for additional education are deeply correlated with the 
household type. Based on individual data for children in Japan, Uzuki and Suetomi 
(2016) describe that household income affects additional education for elementary and 
junior high school via additional education expenditures in addition to those for school. 
Nevertheless, no report of the literature describes an empirical examination of public 
and private education choice and income inequality. 
This paper presents consideration of a case in which household education investment 
determines the human capital of children that is given through education of two types: 
public education and private education. Furthermore, this paper explains a theoretical 
model by which income inequality affects the household education choice. In addition, 
based on prefectural panel data in Japan, an empirical examination is presented of 
whether or not the choice of public and private education in junior and senior high 
schools in Japan is affected by household income inequality, and by the subsidy provided 
by central and local governments for high school tuition fees. 
 
 2．Theoretical Model 
   In this section, we set the theoretical model illustrating how income inequality 
affects education choice when households face a choice of education modes: public 
education or private education. We set the model in 2.1. In 2.2, we examine how income 
and income inequality affect the share of households preferring public education. 
 
2.1. Model setting 
Households can obtain utility from consumption and education investment for 
children. The utility function is assumed as 
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𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼ln𝑒𝑒 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)ln𝑐𝑐, 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1, (1) 
where 𝑐𝑐 denotes consumption and 𝑒𝑒 denotes education investment for children. 
For a given income, a household allocates resources for education investment in 
children. There exist education of two types: public and private. Public education, which 
is financed by proportional income taxation, is available free of cost if households choose 
public education. Education investment per capita is therefore equal among children. 
By contrast, each household choosing private education must incur a tax burden for 
public education in addition to its own private education costs. Then, the level of private 
education is determined to hold the desired level. Households make their own choices of 
public and private education. Therefore, the household budget constraint is (1 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑒𝑒 + 𝑐𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 . (2) 
In that equation, 𝜏𝜏 and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 respectively denote the proportional income tax rate and 
the income (0 < 𝜏𝜏 < 1). Heterogeneity exists for income 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  among households. We 
assume that 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  is distributed in [𝑤𝑤0,𝑤𝑤1] . Also, 𝑥𝑥  is the subsidy rate for private 
education (0 < 𝑥𝑥 < 1).2 If the household chooses public education, then the education 
investment that they must pay for the education investment is zero: 𝑒𝑒 = 0. However, if 
they choose private education, then 𝑒𝑒 > 0 is obtainable. 
In the case of private education, education investment and consumption are shown 
as 
𝑒𝑒 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑥𝑥 , (3) 
𝑐𝑐 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 . (4) 
Substituting (3) and (4) into (1), we can obtain the indirect utility function by which 
households choose private education as shown below. 
𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = ln(1− 𝜏𝜏) + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼ln𝛼𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)ln(1− 𝛼𝛼) − 𝛼𝛼ln(1− 𝑥𝑥), (5) 
If a household chooses public education, then the public education expenditure is 
                                                   
2 This paper considers no tuition fee policy for public high schools established in 2010 and a 
subsidy policy for high schools established in 2014 and examines how these policies affect on 
the education choice with theoretical and empirical model. 
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𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 + 𝑥𝑥� 𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑥𝑥 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤∗ = 𝜏𝜏 � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤0 , (6) 
where 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜃𝜃 respectively denote the public education investment per capita and the 
share of households choosing public education. If households choose public education, 
then they can obtain 𝜃𝜃  as the education level. In addition, 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�  is the density 
function of 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖; (2) can be shown as 𝑐𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖. From this equation and by inputting 
(6) into the utility function, the indirect utility function by which households choose 
public education investment is shown as the following. 
𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼ln𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ln(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (7) 
With 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 , that is, according to the following inequality, the households 
choose private education. 
ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 > ln𝜃𝜃 − ln(1− 𝜏𝜏) + ln(1− 𝑥𝑥) − ln𝛼𝛼 − 1 − 𝛼𝛼
𝛼𝛼
ln(1− 𝛼𝛼) (8) 
Because of (8), one can obtain the following equation. 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 > (1 − 𝑥𝑥)𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  (9) 
We define 𝑤𝑤∗ such that the following equation holds. We assume the parameter 
such that 𝑤𝑤0 < 𝑤𝑤∗ < 𝑤𝑤1 holds.3 
𝑤𝑤∗ = (1 − 𝑥𝑥)𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  (10) 
Households that have 𝑤𝑤0 < 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 < 𝑤𝑤∗ choose public education. Otherwise, it is 𝑤𝑤∗ <
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 < 𝑤𝑤1, indicating that the households choose private education. The ratio by which 
the households choose public education 𝜃𝜃  is determined such that the following 
equation holds. 
𝜃𝜃 = � 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤∗
𝑤𝑤0
 (11) 
Considering (10) and (11), one can obtain the following equation. 
                                                   
3 This assumption is necessary for households to choose public and private education in this model. 
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𝜃𝜃 = � 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (1−𝑥𝑥)𝐸𝐸(1−𝜏𝜏)𝛼𝛼(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
𝑤𝑤0 . (12) 
This paper presents consideration that the level of public education is determined 
according to a probabilistic voting model. We assume social welfare function SW of the 
following form as4 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝛺𝛺𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + (1 − 𝛺𝛺)𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  
                    = 𝛺𝛺�𝛼𝛼ln𝜃𝜃 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ln(1 − 𝜏𝜏)� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤∗
𝑤𝑤0
� 
    + (1 −𝛺𝛺) �ln(1− 𝜏𝜏)− 𝛼𝛼 ln(1 − 𝑥𝑥) + ln� 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1
𝑤𝑤∗
�, 
(13) 
where 0 < 𝛺𝛺 < 1 . Here, 𝛺𝛺  denotes the weight parameter of how the government 
considers both public and private education. 
The government provides public education services to maximize SW (13) subject to 
(6). Also, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
= 0 can be shown as presented below. 
𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜏𝜏)
𝜃𝜃
= �1 − 𝛼𝛼 + 1 −𝛺𝛺
𝛺𝛺
�
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
 (14) 
Therein, 𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸
= 𝜃𝜃
∫ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
 𝑤𝑤1
𝑤𝑤0
. Then, the share of household that selects public education 
𝜃𝜃 is shown as presented below: 
                                                   
4 In this paper, we consider social welfare function that consist of indirect utility function that is average 
income households of public and private education, respectively. If we consider social welfare function 
as the total of indirect utility function, the social welfare function is shown as  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝛺𝛺� 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤∗
𝑤𝑤0
+ (1 −𝛺𝛺)� 𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1
𝑤𝑤∗
. 
Then, (14) can be presented as 
𝜃𝜃
𝛼𝛼(1− 𝜏𝜏) = ∫ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤0�1− 𝛼𝛼 + 1 − 𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 1 − 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 � 𝜃𝜃. 
It is difficult to derive the change of right hand side expressly for the change 𝜃𝜃. Therefore, we consider 
social welfare function as (13). The subsidy rate of private education 𝑥𝑥 is set as the parameter, different 
from the income tax rate 𝜏𝜏 and public education 𝜃𝜃. We think that this assumption is consistent with 
current education policy because the subsidy for private education is very small and this policy started 
recently. Then, we consider the maximization of public education. 
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𝜃𝜃 = � 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (1−𝑥𝑥)∫ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤0�1−𝛼𝛼+1−𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 �𝜃𝜃(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
𝑤𝑤0 . (15) 
  Actually, the left-hand side of (15) increases with 𝜃𝜃, but the right-hand side decreases 
concomitantly with increasing 𝜃𝜃. Designating the left-hand side and the right-hand 
side of (15) respectively as L and R, one can obtain the unique equilibrium and derive 
the following figure. 
 
 Figure 2-1-1 Determination of  𝜃𝜃. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An increase in 𝛼𝛼 pulls up line R because the right-hand side of (14) increases as shown 
by the dashed line. Consequently, the intersection of R and L moves upper-rightward; 
ratio 𝜃𝜃 rises.5 
 
2.2. Increase in income inequality and the ratio preferring public education 
We assume the income distribution as the log normal distribution by which the 
average and the variance are shown respectively as exp (𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎𝜎2
2
)  and exp(2𝜇𝜇 +
𝜎𝜎2) (exp(𝜎𝜎2)− 1), and examine how the average and variance of the income affect ratio 
                                                   
5 As shown by a simple calculation, one can verify that an increase in α raises 𝑤𝑤∗ in (10). This shows 
an increase in 𝜃𝜃 as shown by (15). 
R 
R, L 
L 
𝜃𝜃t 
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𝑓𝑓(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖) 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 
𝜃𝜃. Because of the log normal distribution, ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is given as a normal distribution with 
average 𝜇𝜇  and variance 𝜎𝜎2 . Next, we consider the case of an increase in average exp (𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎𝜎2
2
) and variance exp(2𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎𝜎2) (exp(𝜎𝜎2)− 1) brought about by an increase in 
𝜎𝜎  as income inequality. An increase in the variance in the model of log normal 
distribution changes the form of the density function as shown as the following figure. 
 
Figure 2-2-1 Log normal distribution and an increase in the variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An increase in the variance changes from the form depicted by the solid line to the 
dashed line; also, the range widens. Then, defining the cumulative function as 𝐹𝐹�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�, 
the form can be depicted as the following figure The solid line represents the cumulative 
function before changing the variance. After changing, the dashed line can also be 
depicted. 
Now, we examine how the parameters 𝑥𝑥 , 𝛺𝛺 , and 𝜎𝜎  affect the share of public 
education 𝜃𝜃 with the cumulative distributive function of log normal distribution. The 
cumulative distributive function of log normal distribution 𝐹𝐹�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖� can be shown as 
𝐹𝐹�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�＝
12�1 + erf �ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝜎𝜎√2 �� (16) 
where erf denotes the error function and the error function and 𝐹𝐹�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖� increase with 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖. Because of ∫ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤0 = exp (μ+ 𝜎𝜎22 ), (16) can be shown as follows.6 
 
                                                   
6 We can check that 𝜇𝜇 is cancelled with calculation. We do not consider the change of 𝜇𝜇 because the 
change of average is that 𝜇𝜇 is cancelled and the change of 𝜇𝜇 does not affect 𝜃𝜃. 
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𝜃𝜃 = 12
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛1 + erf
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛ln (1 − 𝑥𝑥)∫ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤1𝑤𝑤0
��1−𝛼𝛼 + 1 −𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 �𝜃𝜃(1− 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 �− 𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎√2
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
 
= 12
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛1 + erf
⎝
⎜
⎛
ln (1− 𝑥𝑥) − ln��1−𝛼𝛼 + 1 −𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 �𝜃𝜃(1 −𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 �  
𝜎𝜎√2 + 12�ln� exp�𝜇𝜇 + 𝜎𝜎
22 �exp(𝜇𝜇) �
⎠
⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞
 
(17) 
erf �ln𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎√2
�  increases with ln𝑤𝑤
𝑖𝑖−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎√2
. Then, defining 𝑧𝑧 = ln (1−𝑥𝑥)−ln��1−𝛼𝛼+1−𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 �𝜃𝜃(1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 � 
𝜎𝜎√2 +
12�ln� exp�𝜇𝜇+𝜎𝜎22 �exp(𝜇𝜇) �, we can obtain the following equations: 
𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
= − 12 𝜕𝜕erf𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧1 − 12 𝜕𝜕erf𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧 𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 1𝜎𝜎√2(1 − 𝑥𝑥) < 0 (18) 
𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃
𝑑𝑑𝛺𝛺
= 12 𝜕𝜕erf𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧1 − 12 𝜕𝜕erf𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧 𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 1𝜎𝜎√2𝛺𝛺2 �1 − 𝛼𝛼 + 1 −ΩΩ � > 0 (19) 
𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃
𝑑𝑑𝜎𝜎
= 12𝜕𝜕erf𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧1 − 12 𝜕𝜕erf𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧 𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 1 −
2ln 1 − 𝑥𝑥
�1 − 𝛼𝛼 + 1 − 𝛺𝛺
𝛺𝛺
� 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
𝜎𝜎22√2 >< 0 (20) 
However, an increase in 𝜎𝜎 does not always increase erf. An increase in 𝜎𝜎 raises of the 
first term of erf and reduces the second term.7 An increase in subsidy rate for private 
education 𝑥𝑥 reduces 𝜃𝜃, with an increased 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛺𝛺 raising 𝜃𝜃. 
 
                                                   
7 We assume ln(1 − 𝑥𝑥) − ln ��1 −𝛼𝛼 + 1−𝛺𝛺
𝛺𝛺
�𝜃𝜃(1− 𝛼𝛼)1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 � > 0, that is, 𝑥𝑥  is small. The government 
stated the policy of the subsidy for private education recently and compared it with the level of public 
education, the subsidy for private education is very small. Then, we consider that this assumption is 
consistent with the situation in Japan. 
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3．Empirical Research 
This section presents an empirical examination, based on prefecture panel data, of 
whether income inequality affects the education choices related to public and private 
education in junior high school and high school in Japan. We set the model for the 
empirical examination as described in subsection 3.1. Subsection 3.2 explains the data. 
In subsection 3.3, we check and consider the estimation results and derive the policy 
implications. 
 
3.1. Estimation model 
This paper presents an examination of correlation between household education 
choice of public and private education and income inequality. Concretely, based on the 
theoretical model presented in section 2, equations (15) and (17) show that household 
income and income inequality affect the enrollment rates for public junior high schools 
and high schools. We can empirically examine the factors which determine the 
enrollment rate for public schools using the following linear regression model. 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑑𝑑2012+𝛽𝛽3𝑑𝑑2017 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑑𝑑2017 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3
+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡4 + � 𝛾𝛾12017
1992
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑑𝑑2017 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (21) 
Therein, 𝑖𝑖 (= 47)  and 𝑡𝑡 (= 1992,1997,2002,2007,2012,2017)  respectively denote 
the indexes of the prefecture and fiscal year. The dependent variable  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represents 
the enrollment in first grade of a public school. The explanatory variable  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1  shows the 
index of heterogeneity of household income. This index is obtainable by estimating the 
Fractionalization Index (FRAC), as reported by Taylor and Hudson (1972), based on 
data of the number of general households with children at each income level.8 In 
addition, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2  denotes the ratio of real income in the household of working generation to 
the median income in a general household with children.9 In addition, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡3   denotes the 
                                                   
8 Based on FRAC = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�1 −𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 , we use data of general households with children at each 
income level and estimate them based on ‘Shuugyoukouzoukihonchousa.’ 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 denotes the ratio of the 
hierarchy of household income 𝑗𝑗 to total households. As shown by the definition, if FRAC is close to 1, 
then the heterogeneity of the income within the region is high. 
9 This paper uses the ratio of the real income of the household with working generation to the median 
income of general households with children as the proxy variables of the ratio of the average to the 
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ratio of the public junior high schools and high schools to aggregate junior high schools 
and high schools in each prefecture. The rate of job openings to job seekers is 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡4 . 
For these analyses, 𝑑𝑑2012 is a dummy variable for which 1 and 0 respectively denote 
2012 and other years, to elucidate the effects of a no tuition fee policy for public high 
schools established in 2010. In addition, 𝑑𝑑2017 is a dummy variable for which 1 and 0 
respectively denote 2017 and other years, to elucidate the effects of a subsidy policy for 
high schools established in 2014 by changing the old system. 
Also, 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 is a dummy variable representing the effects of an additional subsidy of 
prefectures over and above the central government level in the policy of subsidy for high 
school fees. A prefecture that presents an additional subsidy for more than 5.9 million 
JPY household or its own subsidy for enrollment fees is assigned 1. Otherwise, 0 is 
assigned as the value of the variable. 
Additionally, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 respectively stand for the individual effect and time effect, 
whereas 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is an error term of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡～𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑(0,𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2). 
If the education choice of public and private education in junior high school and high 
school is affected by household income inequality, then 𝛽𝛽1  can be affected. It is 
important that a no-tuition fee policy for public high schools and a policy decreasing 
tuition fees for private high schools be provided simultaneously by the government. 
Therefore, we can reasonably infer increased enrollment not only for public high schools 
but also for private high schools. Therefore, we expect the sign of 𝛽𝛽2 to be negative.  
The high school subsidy policy is limited to households with a certain income. 
However, the decrease in tuition fees of public and private high schools for low income 
households is extended. Some prefectures provide self-subsidies for tuition fees that are 
higher than the level of central government. These effects promote the enrollment of 
private high schools and private junior high schools before enrollment for high school. 
Therefore, the signs of 𝛽𝛽3 and 𝛽𝛽4 can be expected to be negative. 
 
                                                   
median. Then, the sign of 𝛽𝛽5 can be expected to be positive. 
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3.2. Data 
Actually, (21) is estimated from prefecture panel data obtained for six years: 1992, 
1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017. We explain the data as described hereinafter. 
Enrollment for the first grade of public junior high school or high school, which is the 
dependent variable, is derived by dividing the number of the first grade students of the 
public junior high schools and high schools (full time and part time) in each prefecture 
by the number of the first grade students of all junior high schools and all high schools 
(full time and part time) in each prefecture as shown by the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology ‘Gakkoukihonchousa.’ 
To derive the heterogeneity index of household income, which is an explanatory 
variable, we estimate the FRAC Index based on data of the number of general 
households with children at each income level at each prefecture presented by Statistics 
Japan ‘Shuugyoukouzoukihonchousa’ and by Taylor and Hudson (1972).10 
The ratio of real income and median income as an explanatory variable is derived as 
explained hereinafter. The former is derived by multiplying twelve times the average 
real monthly income of the household with working generation at each city in which the 
prefecture office is located, as shown by Statistics Japan ‘Kakeichousa.’ The latter is 
derived by estimating the annual income at each prefecture with the number of general 
households with children at each prefecture at each income level, as shown by Statistics 
Japan ‘Shuugyoukouzoukihonchousa’.11 Then the logarithm variables of the ratio of the 
two can be derived. 
These two data are set as a real value with the deflator of aggregate expenditure in 
the prefecture, as shown by the Economic and Social Research Institute 
‘Kenminkeizaikeisan.’ 
The ratio of the public junior high schools and high schools as an explanatory 
variable is derived by dividing the respective numbers of public junior high schools and 
                                                   
10 For these explanations, we use the number of the households with husband, wife, and children and 
the households with a husband, wife, their parents, and their children. 
11 Based on Nagamine and Okui (1999), Doi (2000), Takahashi and Miyamoto (2004) and others, we 
derive the income distribution at each prefecture and consider the household income that is given by 
the cumulative relative frequency 50% as the median income. Similarly to Nagamine and Okui (1999), 
we assume that households are distributed horizontally at each household income level. 
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high schools (full time and part time) by the total junior high schools and high schools 
(full time and part time) for prefectures, as shown by the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology ‘Gakkoukihonchousa.’ The ratio of job openings to job 
seekers was derived as an explanatory variable from data of the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare ‘Shokugyouanteigyoumutoukei.’ Descriptive statistics of the 
original data series of each variable are shown in Table 3-2-1. 
 
 Table 3-2-1 Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable 
Average Standard 
deviation 
Max. Min. 
Enrollment rate of first grade in public 
junior high schools 
0.947 0.046 0.991 0.724 
Enrollment rate of first grade in public high 
schools 
0.753 0.090 0.976 0.422 
FRAC 0.840 0.020 0.874 0.762 
Real income (10 thousand JPY) 605.193 68.968 796.965 414.131 
Median income (10 thousand JPY) 593.352 59.587 736.401 379.512 
Ratio of public junior high schools 0.944 0.040 0.995 0.760 
Ratio of public high schools 0.785 0.084 0.939 0.434 
Ratio of job openings to job seekers 0.971 0.404 2.090 0.230 
 
3.3. Results 
This subsection presents results of estimation by the regression of (21). We also 
explain the implications of the results. Table 3-3-1 presents the results of the panel 
analysis of (21), which includes the dummy variable 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒  whether the additional 
subsidy for tuition fees exists in the prefecture or not in the policy of the subsidy for high 
school. Table 3-3-2 considers the dummy variable 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒  whether the subsidy for 
enrollment as prefecture own policy exists or not. Panels (a) and (b) respectively portray 
results obtained for public junior high schools and high schools in the table. In 
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estimation of (21), we select a pool model or fixed effects model with F tests and select a 
fixed effects model or random effects model with the Hausman test. As a result, this 
paper presents result of selected fixed effects model. We infer estimation of a two-way 
error component model that includes both the individual effect and a time effect because 
an aging population with fewer children is expected to progress and because the 
industrial structure and employment status are expected to change during the sample 
period. 
Based on effects of the test for the model specifications, we confirm the statistical 
significance and the condition of the sign of the coefficient. First, FRAC (𝛽𝛽1) shows a 
negative sign and has significance in both (a) and (b) in Table 3-3-1 (additional subsidy 
for tuition fees) and Table 3-3-2 (prefecture own subsidy for enrollment fees). This result 
is consistent with the theoretical model that derives the relation between the level of 
income inequality of households and demand for public education. The logarithm of the 
ratio of real income and the median income (𝛽𝛽5) has no significance in either (a) or (b). 
Public junior high schools and high schools (𝛽𝛽6 ) show a positive sign and have 
significance in both (a) and (b) in Table 3-3-1 and Table 3-3-2. This result is consistent 
with the fact that of the number of public schools in the region is correlated with public 
school enrollment. 
The intersection of FRAC and the dummy of the no tuition fee policy for public high 
schools (𝛽𝛽2) is negative with significance in (a) in Table 3-3-1 and Table 3-3-2. However, 
(b) is negative without significance. This result can be interpreted as follows. The no 
tuition fee policy for public high school includes a policy for decreasing tuition fees for 
private high schools for households with low income. Therefore, this effect does not affect 
the enrollment choice for public and private high schools. It facilitates enrollment for 
private junior high schools.12 However, the intersection of FRAC and the dummy of the 
subsidy policy for high schools (𝛽𝛽3) is negative with significance in both (a) and (b) in 
Table 3-3-1 and Table 3-3-2. This result can be interpreted as follows. The policy for the 
                                                   
12 As the reason for which 𝛽𝛽3 is negative with significance in the result of (a), we can consider that the 
household expects more competition for the enrollment in public high school and prefers the application 
for an enrollment examination for a private junior high school at the early stage because of the policy of 
charging no tuition fees for public high school attendance. 
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high school tuition fee is renewed because the subsidy policy for high schools in 2014 
that supported the old policy was changed.  
 
Table 3-3-1 Estimation results of enrollment in the first grade of public school. 
(Additional subsidy for tuition fees) 
Parameter (Name of variable) 
(a) 
Public junior high school 
(b) 
Public high school 
𝛽𝛽1 (FRAC)  -0.183*** 
(0.061) 
 -0.153* 
(0.084) 
𝛽𝛽2 (FRAC) × 𝑑𝑑2012 -0.216*** 
(0.060) 
-0.130 
(0.123) 
𝛽𝛽3 (FRAC) × 𝑑𝑑2017 -0.463*** 
(0.084) 
-0.140*** 
(0.050) 
𝛽𝛽4 (FRAC) × 𝑑𝑑2017 × 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 0.042 
(0.082) 
-1.092*** 
(0.221) 
𝛽𝛽5 ln (Real income/Median income) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
𝛽𝛽6 (Ratio of public school)  0.494*** 
(0.053) 
0.248** 
(0.101) 
𝛽𝛽7 (Ratio of the job openings to job seekers) -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
F value 
 804.136*** 
(0.000) 
 599.518*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman 
50.578***<8> 
(0.000) 
52.371***<8> 
(0.000) 
AdjR2 0.984 0.979 
Sample size 282 282 
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Table 3-3-2 Estimation results of enrollment in the first grade of public school. 
(Prefecture own subsidy for enrollment fees) 
Parameter (Name of variable) 
(a) 
Public junior high school 
(b) 
Public high school 
𝛽𝛽1 (FRAC) 
 -0.174*** 
(0.057) 
 -0.146** 
(0.068) 
𝛽𝛽2 (FRAC) × 𝑑𝑑2012 
-0.213*** 
(0.056) 
-0.128 
(0.125) 
𝛽𝛽3 (FRAC) × 𝑑𝑑2017 
-0.538*** 
(0.106) 
-0.233*** 
(0.042) 
𝛽𝛽4 (FRAC) ×𝑑𝑑2017×𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 
0.276*** 
(0.086) 
-0.186** 
(0.096) 
𝛽𝛽5 ln (Real income/Median income) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
𝛽𝛽6 (Ratio of public school) 
 0.485*** 
(0.049) 
0.255** 
(0.104) 
𝛽𝛽7 (Ratio of the job openings to job seekers) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
F value 
 797.269*** 
(0.000) 
 607.822*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman 
49.048***<8> 
(0.000) 
56.457***<8> 
(0.000) 
Adj.R2 0.984 0.979 
Sample size 282 282 
Note 1) Estimation results show the estimation of fixed effects model that is adopted as a result of test for the error for the model specification. 
For simplicity, the value of the constant term is omitted. 
 Note 2) ***, ** and * respectively portray the significance of two-sided test of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 Note 3) Brackets in parameters show the heteroscedasticity robust standard error. AdjR 2 represents the adjusted R-square. Brackets in F 
value and Hausman show the p-value; the value of < > in Hausman represents the degrees of freedom. 
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Although this new policy has an income level constraint, the reduction in the amount of 
tuition fees for the private high schools is extended under this policy. Therefore, 
enrollment in public high schools is hindered, whereas enrollment in private high 
schools is facilitated. Similarly, enrollment in public junior high schools is hindered, but 
enrollment in private junior high schools is facilitated. 
In addition, the coefficient term (𝛽𝛽4) of FRAC Index, an additional subsidy is provided 
by the prefecture for tuition fees, and a dummy of subsidy for tuition fees of high school 
with negative sign and significance are shown in Table 3-3-1 and Table 3-3-2. They show 
that enrollment in public high schools is hindered, whereas enrollment in private high 
schools is facilitated. 
One can obtain the following three points of the determination of the enrollment for 
public schools as empirical research. First, the coefficient of FRAC 𝛽𝛽1 is negative and 
significant in (a) and (b). Therefore, enrollment in public junior high schools and high 
schools tends to decrease in prefectures with high heterogeneity of household income. 
Second, the intersection coefficient of FRAC and the dummy of the no tuition policy for 
public high schools 𝛽𝛽2 is negative with significance in (a), but it is not significant in (b). 
Therefore, this is no tuition policy for public high schools. The policy for a decrease in 
tuition fees for private high schools for low-income households do not affect enrollment 
choice for public and private high schools. However, enrollment in private junior high 
schools is facilitated. Third, the intersection coefficient of FRAC and the dummy of the 
subsidy policy for the high school 𝛽𝛽3  and 𝛽𝛽4  are negative with significance in (b). 
Therefore, enrollment in public high schools is hindered, although enrollment in private 
high schools is facilitated because of the policy for decreasing tuition fees for public and 
private high schools, even if this policy has an income level constraint. 
 
 4. Conclusions 
This paper presents consideration of a case in which household education investment 
determines the human capital of children that is given through education of two types: 
public education and private education. Furthermore, this paper explains a theoretical 
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model by which income inequality affects the household education choice. In addition, 
based on prefectural panel data in Japan, an empirical examination is presented of 
whether or not the choice of public and private education in junior and senior high 
schools in Japan is affected by household income inequality, and by the subsidy provided 
by central and local governments for tuition fee of high school. 
As results of empirical studies, we can obtain the following three points. First, the 
coefficient of FRAC index 𝛽𝛽1 is negative and has significance. Therefore, enrollment for 
public junior high schools and high schools is low for prefectures in which income 
inequality is high. Second, the coefficient of intersection of the FRAC index and the 
dummy of the policy of no intuition fee for public high school 𝛽𝛽2  is negative, with 
significance found for the estimation of public junior high schools. However, in the case 
of public high school, no significance was found. Results demonstrate that the policy of 
no tuition fee for public high schools and the subsidy for decreasing tuition fees for the 
private high schools does not affect public and private education choice. However, 
enrollment for private junior high schools is facilitated. Third, the coefficient of the 
intersection of the FRAC index and the dummy of the policy for the subsidy for the 
tuition fees of high school 𝛽𝛽3 and 𝛽𝛽4 is negative and has significance. Therefore, even 
if this policy has an income constraint, an increase in households affected by a policy of 
a decreased tuition fees for private high schools raises enrollment in private high schools 
(enrollment in public high schools is hindered). In addition, this result is enforced in 
prefectures that provide their own policy for tuition fee and enrollment fee assistance. 
A series of empirical studies can be undertaken to assess effects of an increase in 
income inequality on public and private education choices for junior high school and 
high school in Japan. Studies can also assess which subsidy for public or private high 
schools has a more positive effect on the choice of private education. A future increase 
in income inequality among households can be anticipated. Therefore, subsidies for 
tuition fees for high school should be continued and applied to every type of school to 
maintain neutrality for education choice that depends on the household income level. 
Finally, two points should be underscored. The first is derivation of regression that 
incorporates private supplementary tutoring. As a feature of education costs in Japan, 
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high additional education costs are imposed by test preparatory schools and tutors. 
Although it is important to assess how education aside from school education affects 
education choice, these expenditures are not considered in the empirical research 
described in this paper. Paid education fee data for each prefecture are obtainable from 
‘Kakeichousa’ and ‘Zenkokushouhijittaichousa’ data. Therefore, some room for 
improvement can be found for this study simply by using regression analysis that 
incorporates the endogeneity problem with a dummy variable representing public 
subsidies for tuition fees and additional education expenditures other than those for the 
school. 
The second point is setting of the theoretical model. These analyses assume a simple 
model as the log utility function and the density function given by the log normal 
distribution for ease of examination. The results can change according to this 
assumption. However, it is insufficient to examine that assumption. Moreover, the 
theoretical model does not include additional education costs except for those related to 
school. For that reason, these effects on the results can not be examined. Therefore, it is 
necessary for future research that the model be set to resolve the difficulties described 
above. 
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